



**МОНГОЛЬСКАЯ ИМПЕРИЯ И ЗАВОЕВАНИЕ МИРА:
СТРАНИЦЫ ИСТОРИИ**

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**TO «CONQUER ROME AND BEYOND ROME»:
THE MONGOL IDEOLOGY OF WORLD DOMINATION
IN MEDIEVAL REALITY AND IMAGINATION**

INTRODUCTION

In modern academic works discussing the epoch of the Mongols' campaigns, particularly the Great Western Campaign (1236–1242), we find a contradictory picture made up of divergent and sometimes mutually exclusive views on the key question of the goals of the conquerors,

and the extent to which the conquests in the West correlated with the larger strategic aims of the Mongol Empire. The tone of the discussion is well reflected by an authoritative opinion originating from Denis Sinor who claimed that the Mongol conquests in the West were essentially of a random nature: «The Mongol conquest of the western regions — including Iran and Eastern Europe — may be regarded as a by-product, as it were, of personal ambitions, of mistakes made by rulers of limited abilities, of armies left to their own devices to determine their course of action»¹. Peter Jackson similarly argued that the Mongol conquests of the West were relatively limited; the successful achievement of their circumscribed goals — to chastise the Hungarian ruler — explains the quick withdrawal of the Mongol armies from the Kingdom of Hungary in 1242. Rumours about Mongol plans to conquer Rome and Germany (i. e. the Holy Roman Empire), widespread in the West, were greatly exaggerated and «very probably spring from Western assumptions that the invaders were the peoples referred to in apocalyptic literature»². At the same time, Jackson accepted the notion that the Mongols had plans of world conquest already in Genghis Khan's reign³.

According to David Morgan, the main objectives of the Mongols in the West were primarily the Qipchaq steppe along with the neighbouring Rus' principalities «even if the forest land of those parts was not for its own sake attractive in Mongol eyes»⁴. Timothy May argues that by sending their armies to the West, the Mongols wished to create an «adequate realm for the descendants of Jochi». While the Qipchaqs' pastures were a target, Mongol military advances were only «ancillary» actions that contributed to the achievement of the aforementioned primary goals⁵.

Alongside the somewhat overlapping opinions cited above, there is an alternative, broader view on the character and goals of the Mongol conquests. There are numerous historical accounts testifying that the Mongols saw themselves as God's chosen people, and Genghis (Chinggis, Činggis, Jenghiz, etc.) Khan (Qan) was his messenger. For instance, the Mongols believed that *Eternal Heaven* (*Möngke Tenggeri* or *Tengri*) favoured Genghis Khan by bestowing upon him a divine mandate and granting him special good fortune (the imperial *Su*)⁶. They saw their campaigns of conquest as a holy war legitimized by *Tenggeri*. According to George Lane, the Mongols saw theirs as a world empire rather than some equal or rival competitor with other powers⁷. Historians still debate whether Genghis Khan himself believed in his divine mandate, but clearly his offspring did, claiming that his divinely granted good fortune had been passed onto them. The imperial fortune became linked to the four sons borne

¹ *Sinor D.* The Mongols in the West // *Journal of Asian History*. 1999. Vol. 33. P. 1.

² *Jackson P.* The Mongols and the West, 1221–1410. London and New York, 2005. P. 73. — On the reasons for the withdrawal of the Mongol armies from the Hungarian kingdom, see: *Pow S.* Conquest and Withdrawal: The Mongol Invasions of Europe in the thirteenth century. Dissertation. Central European University, 2020.

³ *Jackson P.* World-Conquest and Local Accommodation: Threat and Blandishment in Mongol Diplomacy // *History and historiography of Post-Mongol Central Asia and the Middle East: Studies in Honor of John E. Woods* / Eds. J. Pfeiffer and S. A. Quinn. Wiesbaden, 2006. P. 3–10.

⁴ *Morgan D.* The Mongols. 2nd ed. Oxford, 2007. P. 120.

⁵ *May T.* The Mongol Empire. Edinburgh, 2018. P. 108.

⁶ For more see: *Allsen T. T.* Imperial Ideology // *The Cambridge History of the Mongol Empire*. Cambridge, 2023. Vol. 1. P. 444–459.

⁷ *Lane G.* Daily Life in the Mongol Empire. Indianapolis, Ind., 2006. P. 203.

by Genghis Khan's senior wife Börte: Jochi, Chagatai, Ögödei and Tolui, as well as to their descendants⁸. In obedience to the will of the Eternal Sky, the members of the imperial, or «golden», family tried to impose Genghisid universal rule on the entire world⁹. Already half a century ago, when analysing Ögödei's (1229–1241) imperial strategy with regard to the East as well as the West, John Joseph Saunders suggested that as long as rebellious enemy powers existed, «the Mongol sword could not be sheathed»¹⁰. This general conclusion has been reaffirmed and further elaborated by Stephen Pow. He argues that, at the beginning of 1241, the Mongols planned to conquer most of Europe, and such plans were only part of a vaster programme of conquering the world. From the language of their surviving ultimatums, a world conquest would seem to be a situation in which all the world's sizeable populations acknowledged Mongol supremacy and proffered tribute¹¹.

In the present paper, we attempt to determine, with a degree of precision, — and based on source materials from distinct linguistic and cultural milieus that would prevent their authors' sharing details — the chronological timeframe in which the Mongols' claims for world domination gained real political force and the ideological foundation for the universal empire of Genghis Khan and his heirs took shape. We focus particularly on the extent to which this religiously motivated doctrine of global dominion was able to influence the character and determine the actual goals of the Great Western Campaign. As such, all stages of that major military operation, led by the highest-ranked Mongol princes, should be evaluated as an attempt at lasting conquest rather than lesser aims, suggested in aforementioned scholarship, like chastising the Hungarian king, recapturing their escaped Cuman subjects, or securing a buffer against Latin Europe's peoples. The apocalyptic fears and perceptions that resulted from sedentary societies' awareness of the Mongols' world rulership ideology, so replete in surviving thirteenth-century sources composed across the whole western stretch of Eurasia, work in some sense to obfuscate and conceal what seems to be, in fact, a well-supported historical basis for arguing that a project of world conquest was genuinely envisioned by the Mongol Empire's leadership.

The examination of the evolution and chronology of the Mongol world conquest ideology as belief and practice, essential for understanding Mongol imperial expansion, still presents considerable difficulties. Researchers cannot build an argument based on direct evidence from the sources, particularly Mongolian ones, and must make do with either sensational accounts emerging from contemporary documents or vague and ambiguous allusions. One must sift for strands of historical reality in the apocalyptic visions created in the vast imagination

⁸ Broadbridge A. F. *Kingship and Ideology in the Islamic and Mongol Worlds*. Cambridge, 2008. P. 7.

⁹ For more, see: *Rachewiltz I. de*. Some Remarks on the Ideological Foundations of Chingis Khan's Empire // *Papers on Far Eastern History*. 1973. Vol. 7. P. 21–36; *Beffa M.-L.* Le Concept de tänggäri «ciel» dans l'Histoire secrète des Mongols // *Études Mongoles et Sibériennes*. 1993. Vol. 24. P. 215–236; *Smith J. M., Jr.* The Mongols and world-conquest // *Mongolica*. 1994. Vol. 5. P. 206–214.

¹⁰ *Saunders J. J.* The History of the Mongol Conquests. London, 1971. P. 75. — See also: *Vernadsky G.* The Mongols and Russia. New Haven; London, 1953. P. 92–99; *Spuler B.* The Mongols in History. London, 1971. P. 6–8, 14–15; *Roux J.-P.* Histoire de l'empire Mongol. Paris, 1993. P. 141–144.

¹¹ *Pow S.* Deep Ditches and Well-built Walls: A Reappraisal of the Mongol Withdrawal from Europe in 1242. Thesis. University of Calgary, 2012. P. 39–40.

of medieval authors. Whatever the challenges of the task, there is no other method possible to answer the compelling question of when the conquering policy of Genghis Khan and his descendants assumed its divine foundation and how far-ranging the expansionist desires of the invaders were.

In our study, we operate mainly with details known to scholarship and obtained from published written sources which have been successfully studied by historians for generations. Nonetheless, all these facts require a systematic review for the tasks laid out in this paper. Initially we consider the issue of the Mongols' belief in a heavenly mandate for universal domination and its strengthening as a direct result of the conquest of Transoxiana. We then analyse the historical evidence and significance of the Great Quriltai in 1235 and the Qipchaq Campaign (1236–1242) as a stage in the conquest of the world. Next, we analyse the testimonies of Western contemporaries about the global plans of the Mongols, assessing the degree to which they might reflect either imagined or genuine understanding of the Mongol leaders' aims.

THE MONGOL CONQUEST OF TRANSOXIANA AND THE EMERGENCE OF A HEAVENLY MANDATE FOR UNIVERSAL DOMINION IN PRACTICE

As a preliminary to proposing a relatively precise and earlier timeframe for the emergence of the Mongol world conquest ideology, it is necessary to first address a prevailing and popular notion in scholarship that such an outlook did not exist among the Mongols until several years or more than a decade after Genghis Khan's death in 1227. What is not disputed is that the claims of world domination which shaped the aggressive imperial strategy had strong foundations in the religious worldview of the Mongol elite. Moreover, while it exceeds the scope of this paper, it must be acknowledged that such aspirations were not an utterly novel development — it is well known that expressions, at least, of world domination can be found in preceding steppe empires like the Qara Khitai, the Uyghurs, and the Göktürks. Genghis Khan and his successors firmly believed in the omnipotent and supreme power of *Tenggeri* (Heaven, Sky etc.) which was held to have entrusted them with a Divine Mission and Fortune (*suu tail*) to rule over all countries and peoples under Heaven. According to the expressed notion of Tenggerism, the power of Mongol khans had to be expanded as far as Blue Heaven (*Koke Tenggeri*) extended over the world; and this domination had to last as long as Eternal Heaven (*Mongke Tenggeri*) itself¹². The special place of the Mongols among peoples of the world is reflected in the Mongolian language used in source materials that survive from the Mongol imperial period, particularly the *Secret History*. Contemporary peoples were denoted as *irgen* (a people; an ethno-cultural entity that could be a state) but that term as well as *ulus* and especially *yeke mongqol ulus* (Great Mongol *ulus*) was applied to the Mongols. Hodong Kim points out that the *Secret History of the Mongols* also refers to the Kereits, Tatars, Merkits and Naimans as *uluses* which might signify that the Mongols became the *only* *ulus* after conquering all their Mongolia-based rivals. While such terms are loaded with senses, *ulus* conveyed, in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, a great political state and

¹² *Bira Sh.* Mongolian Tenggerism and Modern Globalism. A Retrospective Outlook on Globalisation // *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*. Third Series. 2004. Vol. 14. P. 3–12. — See also *Amitai R.* Holy War and Rapprochement. Studies in the Relations between the Mamluk Sultanate and the Mongol Ilkhanate (1260–1335). Turnhout, 2013. P. 39–43.

a category unique to the Mongols among all the peoples under Heaven — the Mongol *ulus* was a state, «a bounded body of population with a definite territory», and *yeke mongqol ulus* conveyed the Great Mongol Empire¹³. Thus, even their complex and sometimes ambiguous terminology in the period reflected this sense of the Mongols' special political place among the world's peoples.

The ideology of world domination was indisputably fully developed by the mid-1240s and found its manifestation in the ultimatums that the Mongols sent to the Latin West, starting with Güyük Qaghan's ultimatum which was received by the papal envoy, John of Plano Carpini, in 1246 and taken back to the papal curia¹⁴. Since the original document in Persian with Güyük's own seal is preserved up to the present, we need not imagine that its content was a fabricated product of European imaginations. Moreover, it fits rather well with other examples and formulae. For instance, Mongol rulers were certain that their messages merely communicated the «Orders of God». The recipient was informed of his place in the Mongol world-empire, was ordered to recognize it by submitting in person and making his resources and troops available to the conquerors, and was warned that persistence in «rebellion» carried severe consequences which were all the more menacing for being left unspecified in many such missives¹⁵.

While most modern researchers do not doubt that the existence of the imperial ideology, based on a sacred foundation, fuelled the aspirations of the Mongol elite toward world domination, the question as to when it emerged is difficult to answer and rife with historians' arguments¹⁶. By as early as the 1230s and 1240s, we encounter Western observers, eye witnesses indeed of Mongol diplomacy, who explicitly described it. After John of Plano Carpini visited the headquarters of Güyük Qaghan, he reported that the Mongols not only believed in a divine mandate to conquer the world but associated that mission with an edict of Genghis Khan himself¹⁷. Although the Mongol sources do not directly confirm this statement made by Carpini, by the time of the 1206 Quriltai at which Genghis Khan's supreme authority

¹³ *Munkh-Erdene L.* Where did the Mongol Empire come from? Medieval Mongol Ideas of People, State // Inner Asia. 2001. Vol. 13. N 2. P. 213–217, 221–222. — For a recent study, see: *Kim H.* Formation and Changes of Uluses in the Mongol Empire // Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient. 2019. Vol. 62. P. 269–317.

¹⁴ *Dawson Ch.* The Mongol Mission. New York, 1955. P. 85–86.

¹⁵ *Voegelin E.* The Mongol orders of submission to European powers, 1245–1255 // Byzantion. 1940–1941. Vol. 15. P. 378–413; *Richard J.* Ultimatums mongols et lettres apocryphes: L'Occident et les motifs de guerre des Tartares // Central Asiatic Journal. 1973. Vol. 17. P. 216–217. — See also: *Jackson P.* Mongols and the West... P. 47.

¹⁶ See: *Sagaster K.* Herrschaftsideologie und Friedensgedanke bei den Mongolen // Central Asiatic Journal. 1973. Vol. 17. P. 223–242; *Khazanov A. M.* Muhammad and Jenghiz Khan Compared: The Religious Factor in World Empire Building // Comparative Studies in Society and History. 1993. Vol. 35. P. 461–479; *Gießauf J.* Der Traum von der Weltherrschaft: Eine Skizze der politischen Geschichte des mongolischen Großreichs vom Tode Cinggis Khans bis zum Zerfall in Einzelhanate // Die Mongolei: Aspekte ihrer Geschichte und Kultur. Graz, 2001. S. 47–77; *Дробышев Ю. И.* У истоков имперской идеологии средневековых монголов // Общество и государство в Китае. 2012. Т. 42. С. 274–314.

¹⁷ *Giovanni di Plan di Carpine.* Storia dei Mongoli / Eds. E. Menestò et al. Spoleto, 1989. P. 264, 284–285, 293; The Story of the Mongols whom we call the Tartars by Friar Giovanni Di Plano Carpini / Transl. E. Hildinger. Boston, 1996. P. 63–64, 79, 85.

over the steppe peoples of Mongolia was made official, the khan had obviously already conceived certain imperial aspirations which were initially limited to only the subjugation of the steppe nomadic tribes — «the people of the felt-walled tents» — as the *Secret History of the Mongols* phrases it when recounting his enthronement¹⁸.

Genghis Khan's ambitions expanded — geographically in a sense — with each new victory won by the Mongols. According to Igor de Rachewiltz, the ambitions of the Mongol rulers reached a global scale only after the death of the founder of their empire, most likely by the end of the Great Western Campaign (c. 1236–1242): «I am now of the opinion that while the seed of the world-domination ideology were sown by Činggis Qan from his firm belief that he enjoyed the protection of Heaven, the fruit matured under Ögödei as a result of the Mongol armies' victories in North China and in the West. *Post factum* references to Činggis Qan in later sources are due to the need of legitimizing the conquest in the name of the dynasty's founder and as the latter's ideological legacy to his heirs»¹⁹. Peter Jackson notes, at least in his important monograph on the Mongols' relations with the West, that the earliest direct evidence of the Mongols' belief in the divine mandate of their rulers for universal domination dates from the 1240s (with the papal embassies). Other corroborating sources like Juwaynī, even when describing the ideology being expressed in sieges of the 1220s, was actually himself writing considerably later in the 1260s²⁰. Some historians will concede that perhaps the Mongol ruling strata had shaped their global ambitions and the corresponding plans a little earlier than the papal embassies of the 1240s, perhaps shortly before the Great Western Campaign's planning period. It has thus been argued that the Mongol doctrine of divine mandate for universal rule had most probably developed by the middle of the 1230s²¹, and that such a doctrine was first translated into actual military planning specifically at the Quriltai of 1234 and 1235²².

Such being the case in the scholarship, we lately have views like that of Timothy May that it was only during Ögödei's rule that the Mongols began to conceive a plan for conquering the world. In this respect, the historian places Genghis Khan in direct contrast to Ögödei. While the idea of world conquest is often ascribed to the founder of the Mongol Empire, May argues that his actions speak against this idea: «His goal seemed to have been more to secure the steppes of Mongolia from external threats than to dominate sedentary cultures. Raids and forcing sedentary states to pay tribute helped this process and were economically profitable. Ögödei, however, embraced the idea of conquest and encouraged the belief that Heaven had decreed that Chinggis Khan and his heirs should rule the world»²³.

¹⁸ Козин С. А. Сокровенное сказание. М.; Л., 1940. С. 158–160, 276–278, 475–477; The Secret History of the Mongols / Transl. and com. I. de Rachewiltz. Leiden and Boston, 2004. P. 133, 135.

¹⁹ Rachewiltz I. de. Heaven, Earth and the Mongols in the Time of Činggis Qan and his Immediate Successors (ca. 1160–1260) — A Preliminary Investigation // A Lifelong Dedication to the China Mission: Essays Presented in Honor of Father Jeroom Heyndrickx, CICM, on the Occasion of his 75th Birthday and the 25th Anniversary of the F. Verbiest Institute K. U. Leuven. Leuven, 2007. P. 128–129, n. 72. — See also: Dunnell R. W. The Rise of Chinggis Khan and the Unites Empire, 1206–1260 // The Cambridge History of the Mongol. Cambridge, 2023. Vol. 1. P. 95.

²⁰ Jackson P. Mongols and the West... P. 46.

²¹ Grant A. C. The Mongol Invasions between Epistolography and Prophecy. The Case of the Letter 'Ad Flagellum', c. 1235/36–1338 // Traditio. 2018. Vol. 73. P. 145, 148.

²² Дробышев Ю. И. У истоков имперской идеологии. С. 303.

²³ May T. The Mongol Conquests in World History. London, 2012. P. 48.

This point of view to a certain extent stands at odds with the widely accepted source-based details that Genghis Khan had notions of heavenly predestination and his own destiny for great things early on; these became evident already after his battles with the Merkits and the Kereits in the first years of the 1200s²⁴. Yet, it seems likely that the development of an ideology of world domination that was fully articulated and put into practice is something that emerged during or immediately following the conquest of Khwārazm (1219–1221). Earlier historians have touched on such a viewpoint though without fully exploring the evidence for it. According to Thomas Allsen, before the Khwārazm campaign, the Mongols evinced no claims of universal sovereignty. The confrontation between the Mongols and Khwārazm redirected their military efforts and widened their political horizons and outlooks. After the conquest of Khwārazm, «Mongolian diplomatic practice, in both tone and substance, exhibits a markedly different set of political goals and assumptions. Now all foreign states were expected to submit, without hesitation, to the Mongols' empire in-the-making. All who refused or procrastinated were deemed to be in violation of the Mongols' Heavenly mandate for universal dominion and were punished accordingly»²⁵. Paul Ratchnevsky argued that Genghis Khan's claims to world rulership, rooted in his belief that he had been invested with a heavenly mission, were already completely evident at the outset of the Khwārazm campaign around 1218–1219 judging from his possibly sincere proclamation about Heaven granting him the world²⁶. The first modern researcher to advance this idea of Genghis Khan having a fully formed ideology so early was ostensibly W. Barthold who argued that the conflict between the Mongol sovereign and the Khwārazmshāh would have arisen sooner or later inevitably, even without the Utrār incident that led to the murder of Genghis Khan's merchant-envoys²⁷. David Morgan came to the same conclusion: «No doubt, to judge from later Mongol history and the ultimate extent of their conquests, Khwārazm would ultimately have been attacked in any case»²⁸.

It is generally agreed that Genghis Khan deliberately affronted the Khwārazmshāh, Muḥammad II (r. 1200–1220), when he referred to him as «the dearest of my sons» shortly before the outbreak of hostilities²⁹. Regardless of the reasons behind this diplomatic demarche, the message's hint at the superior authority of the Mongol sovereign is obvious. His overture may have been couched in amicable terms, but it strongly hinted at a demand for recognition of his paramountcy³⁰.

There is a recorded episode of great importance in this respect. According to Juwaynī, when the Mongol commanders Jebe and Sübedei closed in on Nīshāpūr in May 1220, as proof of

²⁴ Козин С. А. Сокровенное сказание... С. 104–105, 141, 226–227, 260, 346–347, 458; The Secret History of the Mongols... P. 42–43, 108–109.

²⁵ Allsen T. T. Mongolian Princes and their Merchant Partners, 1200–1260 // Asia Major. Third Series. 1989. Vol. 3. P. 123; see also: Uzelac A. From the Ural River to Constantinople. The Mongol Campaign in Europe (1236–1243). Belgrade, 2023. P. 33–34.

²⁶ Ratchnevsky P. Genghis Khan, his Life and Legacy. Malden, Oxford and Carlton, 1991. P. 159.

²⁷ Barthold W. Turkestan down to the Mongol Invasion. London, 1968. P. 400.

²⁸ Morgan D. Mongols... P. 60.

²⁹ ан-Насаби, Шихаб ад-дин Мухамад. Жизнеописание султана Джалал-ад-Дин Манкбурны / Изд. крит. текста, пер., комм., примеч., указ. З. М. Буниятова. М., 1996. С. 41, 42 (текст), 73 (пер.); Histoire du Sultan Djelal ed-Din Mankobirti prince du Kharezem / Transl. O. Houdas. Paris, 1895. P. 57, 58.

³⁰ Jackson P. World-Conquest and Local Accommodation... P. 5.

their authority, they showed to the residents the *al-tamgha* in the Uyghur script and a copy of a *yarligh* from Genghis Khan which stated: «Let the emirs (=commanders) and great ones and the numerous common people know this that... [lacuna in the original text] all the face of the earth from the going up of the sun to his going down I (=Tengri) have given unto thee (i. e. Genghis Khan). Whosoever, therefore, shall submit, mercy shall be shown unto him and unto his wives and children and household; but whosoever shall not submit, shall perish together with all his wives and children and kinsmen»³¹. If this text is authentic, and it certainly has an air (owing to missing text) of being a verbatim document available and known by Juwaynī, our logical conclusion is that Genghis Khan unequivocally claimed that God had granted him the authority to rule over the whole world — from the rising of the sun to its setting — in his edict (*yarligh*) which has not survived in full.

John Masson Smith Jr. argued that this testimony is authentic evidence for the era to which it relates³², even though it ostensibly resembles language used in Mongol ultimatums of a later period. It must be granted that Juwaynī, who completed his historical work around 658 AH (1260), could have hypothetically assigned, purposefully or inadvertently, the realities of his time to an earlier period³³. According to Reuven Amitai, however, there is no reason to regard the document cited by Juwaynī as a deliberate forgery, misplacement, or misattribution. This document reflects the period when Genghis Khan was at the height of his powers during his campaign against the West (1219–1221). Furthermore, Juwaynī added: «The Mongols wrote documents after this manner and encouraged the people of the town with promises». Would he have included such a detail if his readers would have known the claim was false? It appears, therefore, that at least some, and perhaps the majority, of the urban population of Transoxiana and Khurasan would have been aware of the Mongol imperial ideology during the Mongols' first invasion of the West. Moreover, one of the residents of Nīshāpūr was Juwaynī's father, Bahā' al-Dīn, so the source for this episode seems to have been an especially credible one³⁴. Juwaynī's account concerning the divine mandate of Genghis Khan to rule the world appears to agree with the evidence from a contemporary Chinese source. A Song envoy to the Mongol court in 1221 stated that golden tablets of authority (*paizas*) issued by the Mongol chancery referenced a heavenly mandate; the tablets were engraved with inscriptions in the Uyghur script saying something like «By the Power of Eternal Heaven». This suggests that already by 1221, Mongol officials carried tablets proclaiming Genghis Khan's mandate of Heaven, implying sovereignty over the Earth³⁵.

Taking all the evidence together, it is highly likely that the idea of a mandate from Heaven conferring world rulership had already emerged in the lifetime of Genghis Khan. Initially, he aspired to rule only over the steppe nomads. Adopted Turkic and Chinese political doctrines undoubtedly contributed to the waxing of Genghis Khan's imperial ambitions. These ambitions were fomented by the flight of his defeated nomadic enemies into the territories of their

³¹ *Juwaynī, 'Alā al-Dīn 'Aṭā Malik. Ta'riḫ-i jahān-gushā* / Ed. M. M. Qazwīnī. Leiden and London, 1912. Vol. 1. (Gibb Memorial Series. T. 16). P. 114; *The History of the World-Conqueror by Juvaini* / Transl. J. A. Boyle. Manchester, 1958. P. 145.

³² *Smith J. M., Jr. The Mongols and world-conquest...* P. 207.

³³ See: Jackson P. *World-Conquest and Local Accommodation*. P. 5.

³⁴ *Amitai R. Holy War and Rapprochement...* P. 43–44.

³⁵ *Meng-Ta pei-lu und Hei-Ta shih-lüeh. Chinesische Gesandtenberichte über die frühen Mongolen 1221 und 1237* / Ed. and transl. P. Olbricht and E. Pinks. Wiesbaden, 1980. S. 65, 67, N. 5.

sedentary neighbours. This also served as an incentive to expand the horizon of the Mongol leader's imperial claims which eventually encompassed the whole world — not just in theory but via military action.

We would like to emphasize the significance for this argument that both Eastern and Western sources offer hints that Genghis Khan first conceived of the idea to conquer the whole world owing to the startlingly successful campaign of the Mongol armies in Transoxiana. Friar Julian was the first among Western observers to become acquainted with the Mongol plan of world domination after visiting North-Eastern Rus' in 1237. This Hungarian Dominican friar learned from his Rus' and Magna Hungarian informants that after the victory over the Khwārazmshāh, the Mongol ruler realized he had sufficient power to conquer the whole world: «From these victories [the conquest of the Khwārazmian Empire] he became more daring, and considering himself as the strongest in the world, he [Genghis Khan] started attacking realms in order to subjugate the whole world. That is why, having come to the land of the Cumans, he defeated these Cumans and subjugated their land»³⁶. Thus, we agree with the modern scholarly literature that has argued that after the quick collapse of the Khwārazmian Empire at the hands of Mongol armies, Genghis Khan became convinced that he was destined to rule the whole world and not only the steppe³⁷. It should be acknowledged that the understanding in 1240s European mendicant circles, recorded by Vincent of Beauvais and originating from the report of Simon of Saint-Quentin, a papal envoy to the Mongols, was that they were «instigated by the devil» to desire to conquer the world when Chinggis Khan defeated and killed «King David» (Ong Khan). They then tried to provoke war with the Khwārazmshāh³⁸. According to this version of events, Chinggis Khan already had a vision of conquering the world by the time he unified the steppe in 1206. However, the little longer than a decade that passed between the defeat of Ong Khan and the conquest of the Khwārazmshāh makes Friar Julian's viewpoint more plausible.

If there is truth in what Friar Julian claimed, likely informed by the Rus' who were in direct confrontation already with the Mongols, then Genghis Khan must have expressed his claims to world domination, most probably, when Muhammad II hastily abandoned Transoxiana to its fate and neglected to make a stand at the Oxus River. The helplessness shown by the strongest ruler of Central Asia in the face of the Mongols had the potential to boost the self-esteem of the Mongol leader and might have resulted in a reassessment of the Mongols' capacity to conquer. This ultimately would have led to the adoption of a new, more ambitious strategy with worldwide goals. Certainly, after the conquest of the Khwārazmian Empire, the interests of the Mongols were no longer limited only to the steppe.

³⁶ *Dörrie H.* Drei Texte zur Geschichte der Ungarn und Mongolen: Die Missionsreisen des fr. Julianus O. P. ins Uralgebiet (1234/5) und nach Rußland (1237) und der Bericht des Erzbischofs Peter über die Tartaren // *Nachrichten der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen. I. Philologisch-Historische Klasse.* 1956. Bd. 6. S. 172; *Mongolensturm. Berichte von Augenzeugen und Zeitgenossen, 1235–1250* / Hrsg. H. Göckenjan, J. Sweeney. Graz, etc., 1985. S. 103–104.

³⁷ *Morgan D. O.* *Medieval Persia, 1040–1797.* London; New York, 2016. P. 61; *Biran M.* *Chinggis Khan.* Oxford, 2007. P. 73; *Jackson P.* *The Mongols and the Islamic World: From conquest to conversion.* New Haven and London, 2017. P. 75.

³⁸ *Simon of Saint-Quentin.* *History of the Tartars* / Transl. and com. S. Pow, T. Kiss, A. Romics, F. Ghazaryan. XXX: 87, 88. (Accessed: <http://www.simonofstquentin.org>. Last visited — 03.05.2024).

There is a second important statement that Julian made when he noted that after the fall of «Persia» (i. e. the Khwārazmian Empire), Genghis Khan's immediate next step in this new Mongol conquering strategy was the war against the Cumans (the Western Qipchaqs). This is undoubtedly a reference to the Western Campaign of Jebe and Sübedei and the defeat by the Mongols of the Cumans and their allies, the Rus' princes, in 1223. Such information could only have been received by Friar Julian from locals he encountered on his journeys, and possibly from a Rus' cleric who introduced him to an apocalyptic interpretation of the Mongol threat based on the prophecy of Pseudo-Methodius.

We can see that a newly broadened conquest strategy of the Mongols driven by the concept of a universal empire was manifestly in use during the Western Campaign of Jebe and Sübedei (1220–1223), and it seems to have been aimed likewise against the Rus' in the Battle of the Kalka River in 1223. The tümens which took part in Jebe and Sübedei's invasion north of the Caucasus were not merely conducting a reconnaissance mission despite it usually being described as such in modern scholarship. The campaign was part of Genghis Khan's conquering strategy aimed at the complete subjugation of the Qipchaq and the conquest of the steppe territories not only in present-day Asia but also in Europe. The task of implementing this strategic plan was given to Prince Jochi as the ruler of the western ulus of the Mongol Empire. Jochi was to bring his main military force westward toward Europe while Sübedei and Jebe advanced with their corps to defeat the Qipchaq. The Grand Prince of Kiev and other princes of Southern Rus', being allies and kin of the Qipchaq rulers, gave them military support which led to the Mongols retaliating against the Rus'. After defeating the allied Rus' and Qipchaq forces at the Kalka River, the Mongols succeeded in crossing the Dnieper and went as far as Kiev; with tactical cunning, they crossed the ford on the largest river in Eastern Europe and captured the town of Novgorod Sviatopolchesky, located 60 km south of the capital of Rus'³⁹. However, the refusal of Jochi to bring his main forces to assist the Mongol vanguard army nullified the achievements of Jebe and Sübedei. His reluctance to participate in the Western Campaign of 1221–1223 was related to his conflicts with his younger brothers and Genghis Khan himself. Such a decision seems to have brought about the loss of Jochi's former status in the empire and his untimely death. Thus, Genghis Khan had to reconsider his general conquest strategy; the conquest of Qipchaq and Rus' was postponed for fifteen years⁴⁰.

One of the objectives of Jebe and Sübedei's campaign of conquest was apparently to disseminate throughout the West — viz. the Middle East and Eastern Europe — the message of the birth of a new world empire, alongside a demand for everyone to submit to the God-granted power of Genghis Khan who possessed a divine mandate to rule the whole world. If not successful in permanently subduing all the territories through which they passed, the attack of Jebe and Sübedei served as a demonstration of the military might of the Mongols. It was soon after the citizens of Nishāpūr and much of Khurasan became aware of this situation that the Rus' people were confronted with it as well. The *Tale of the Battle on the Kalka* cites the words of the Mongol envoys, assuring the Rus' princes that the Mongols were «sent by God»⁴¹. It certainly

³⁹ Полное собрание русских летописей (далее — ПСРЛ). Т. 2. М., 1998. Стб. 745.

⁴⁰ For more, see: *Maierov A. V. The First Mongol Invasion of Europe: Goals and Results // Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society. Third Series. 2022. Vol. 32. P. 411–438.*

⁴¹ ПСРЛ. Т. 3. М., 2000. С. 62; *The Chronicle of Novgorod / Transl. R. Michell. P. 65.* — Both the *Tale of the Battle of the Kalka* and the prophecy of Pseudo-Methodius are discussed in detail in the section below on Apocalyptic Interpretations.

seems that the army carried the same message of a divine mandate for world conquest both south and then north of the Caucasus Mountains.

In one of the biographies of Sübedei (*Yuan Shi*, chapter 121), we find evidence that this outstanding commander, shortly after the victory of the Mongols over the combined Russian and Qipchaq troops in the battle on the Kalka River in 1223, proposed to organize into a single army a thousand households of various tribes — Merkits, Naimans, Kereits, Qangli, Qipchaqs — and Genghis Khan allowed this to be done⁴². In the latest studies, this fact is interpreted as the creation of a *tamma* for military control over the newly conquered lands and the continuation of conquests in the western Dasht-i-Qipchaq⁴³.

The information obtained from the biography of Sübedei can be compared with the testimony of another source — the seventeenth-century Mongolian chronicle, the *Altan Tobchi* (*Golden Summary*), which reproduces information from earlier sources including much older chronicles that have not survived. According to the *Altan Tobchi*, Genghis Khan appointed a noyan named Hukin (Khokhin) or Kukin (Qukin noyan) to govern the land of the *Orosut* (Russians) and *Cherkisut* (Circassians)⁴⁴. L. V. Cherepnin has dated this account to the time immediately after the campaign of Jebe and Sübedei to the borders of Rus' in 1222–1224, assessing it as evidence of «the beginning of the implementation of the conquest plans of the Mongols in relation to Eastern Europe»⁴⁵. Thomas Allsen, who likewise took the statement as historical, came to the conclusion that it refers to the first Mongol administrator, similar to a *darugachi* or *basqaq*, appointed to manage the lands of South Rus' and the North Caucasus; he arrived already in the time of Genghis Khan⁴⁶.

Of course, evidence coming from such a late source raises legitimate doubts about its origin and reliability, but we cannot completely discount it. According to the commentators of the *Altan Tobchi*, the noyan named Hukin may correspond to a real person known from other sources⁴⁷. In the list of the Mongol «emirs» of the left wing, given by Rashid ad-Din, a noyan named *Huku-nayan* or *Huqutu noyan*, who held the position of commander of a thousand, is mentioned. Khuku was the son of the Ongirat ruler, Dei Seichen, and the brother of Börte, the eldest wife of Genghis Khan⁴⁸. Support for this identification is found not only in the similarity of names, but also in his familial proximity to the founder of the empire which would explain his high appointment.

⁴² Yuan Shi. Beijing, 1976. P. 2976; Transl.: Pow S., Liao J. Subutai: Sorting fact from fiction surrounding the Mongol Empire's greatest general (with translations of Subutai's two biographies in the Yuan Shi) // Journal of Chinese Military History. 2018. Vol. 7. P. 58.

⁴³ May T. Conquest of the Dasht-i Qipchaq // The Mongol World / Eds. T. May and M. Hope. London; New York, 2022. P. 156; Favereau M. The Horde. How the Mongols changed the World. Cambridge, MA, 2021. P. 80.

⁴⁴ Лубсан Д. Алтан тобчи («Золотое сказание») / Пер. с монг., введ., коммент. и прил. Н. П. Шастиной. М., 1973. С. 232.

⁴⁵ Черепнин Л. В. Монголо-татары на Руси (XIII в.) // Татаро-монголы в Азии и Европе / Ред. С. Л. Тихвинский. М., 1977. С. 190.

⁴⁶ Allsen T. T. Mongols and North Caucasia // Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi. 1987–1991. Vol. 7. P. 31.

⁴⁷ See: Лубсан Д. Алтан тобчи. С. 369, примеч. 55.

⁴⁸ Rashiduddin Fazlullah. Jami'u't-tawarikh: Compendium of Chronicles / Transl. W. M. Thackston. Cambridge, MA, 1998. P. 276–277.

Such an appointment of an overseer would have taken place immediately after the convincing victory of the Mongols over the Russians and Qipchaqs in the Battle of the Kalka (if we accept Cherepnin's dating) which ended in the capture and death of the Kievan and Chernigov princes. This was preceded by Mongol victories over the Alans and other peoples of the North Caucasus and the Sea of Azov. Thus, for some time the Mongols could indeed have considered the lands of Southern Rus' and the surrounding areas between the Dnieper and the Volga to have been pacified. The consequence of that could have been the appointment of an imperial administrator by Genghis Khan.

This is all to point out that immediately after the first major victories over the Russians, Qipchaqs, and Alans in the first half of the 1220s, the Mongols most likely made the first attempt to create their own system of government in the Dasht-i-Qipchaq with its characteristic civil and military institutions represented by *tammachi* and *darugachi*. However, a severe defeat of Sübedei's corps at the hands of Volga Bulgaria, recorded by Ibn al-Athīr and hinted at by Friar Julian, and the subsequent war with the Tanguts and Jin contributed to the Mongols' control of the area being delayed for about one and a half decades. Moreover, the Mongol leadership began to give priority to conquering sedentary peoples. An envoy from Song China, who visited the Mongols in 1237, reported that Genghis Khan had deliberately postponed further campaigns against the Qipchaqs until after the overthrow of the Jurchen-Jin dynasty could be accomplished⁴⁹. This decision must have been made in the immediate years after 1223, at a time when the khan would have heard news about the mixed success and challenges experienced in the Western Campaign of Jebe and Sübedei and its aftermath. The main point of laying out all the above details is to highlight the strong evidence that Genghis Khan was the real instigator of world conquest as a military and political mission in his own lifetime.

THE GREAT QURILTAI OF 1235

AND THE QIPCHAQ CAMPAIGN'S CONNECTIONS TO THE WORLD RULERSHIP IDEOLOGY

Here, we would like to support the above argument for Genghis Khan's institution of the Mongol world mission by pointing out that the wide range of source evidence for a world conquest ideology in the 1230s strongly implies that it already pre-dated that period. In 1235, after consolidating the East in victorious wars against the Jin Empire of northern China and Persia, Ögödei Qaghan (Qa'an) convoked a meeting of the Mongol princes and highest nobility (called the Great Quriltai in the pro-Mongol sources) at which they adopted a new programme of massive conquests both in the East and the West, involving military campaigns against the Song Empire of southern China, Korea, and European countries.

The two most important chroniclers of Mongol conquests, 'Atā-Malik Juwaynī (d. 1283) and Rashīd al-Dīn Hamadānī (d. 1318), give detailed accounts of this event⁵⁰. The less florid and more logically consistent account by Rashīd al-Dīn has a stronger hint of veracity: «Having returned in the Year of the Horse (1234) from his conquest of the lands of Khitai, Qaghan had called an assembly in Talan-Daba and held a Quriltai. In this Year of the Sheep

⁴⁹ Meng-Ta pei-lu und Hei-Ta shih-lüeh... S. 209.

⁵⁰ Juwaynī. Ta'rikh-i jahān-gushā... P. 154–158; The History of the World-Conqueror... P. 196–200; Rasīd al-Dīn Faḍl-Allāh. Jāmi' at-tawārīḥ / Ed. M. Rawshan and M. Mūsawī. T. I: Ta'rikh-i mubārak-i Ghāzānī [A History of the Mongols]. Tihrān, 1994 = 1373 h.š. P. 934–935; Rashiduddin. Compendium of Chronicles... P. 324.

(1235) he wished to reassemble all the sons, kinsfolk, and emirs and cause them to listen once again to the yasas and ordinances».

After the lavish festivities, which lasted a whole month and involved plentiful feasts and exchanges of valuable gifts, they began to discuss state affairs and new plans for conquest. According to Juwaynī, Ögödei «charged each of his sons and kinsmen with a different campaign and resolved once again to take part in person and set his reins in motion». Rashīd al-Dīn gives more specific details regarding Ögödei's original intentions: The Qaghan dispatched «each one of his kinsmen in a different direction and intended to proceed in his own person to the Qipchaq (=Qipchaq / Kipchak) Steppe».

Later, however, Ögödei's original plans were significantly altered at the suggestion of the Toluid prince, Möngke. The Qaghan changed his mind about personally participating in the Western campaign, instead assigning the leadership of the campaign to the princes, Batu, Möngke, and Güyük. The main targets of the Western Campaign, apart from the Qipchaqs, were to include the Hungarians, Volga Bulgars, and Rus'. Juwaynī noted, «Since the tribes of the Qipchaq (=Qipchaqs) and the Keler (=Hungarians) had not yet been completely crushed the particular attention was paid to the conquest and extirpation of these peoples. From among the princes Batu, Mengü Qa'an (=Möngke) and Güyük were assigned to lead this campaign». Rashīd al-Dīn echoes that account, adding more specific details: «...and the august mind of Qa'an resolved that of the princes, Batu, Möngke Qa'an, and Güyük Khan, together with others of the princes and a great army, should set out for the countries of the Qipchaq (=Qipchaqs), Orus (=Rus'), Bular (=Volga Bulgars), Majar (=Magyars), Bashghird (=Bashkirs), Sudaq, and [all] that region and subjugate them all»⁵¹.

The accounts by insiders about the Great Quriltai of 1235 contain some evidence of the worldwide scale of the forthcoming conquests — and that the entire project was viewed as an effort at world conquest. Juwaynī, when describing how the feasting ended and the talk turned to military strategy and campaign plans, added an important detail: «Since there were many parts of the climes where the wind of rebellion had not left men's brains, he charged each of his sons and kinsmen with a different campaign and resolved once again to take part in person and set his reins in motion»⁵². The reference here reflects a widespread concept, existing in medieval Islamic geographic literature, of the Earth being divided into several climes. Thus, this can be taken as a clear reference to the conquest of the world — as the world was understood by scholars of the period — within the framework of the discussions taking place among the Mongol Empire's supreme leadership in 1235. However, since Juwaynī was so prone to poetic symbolism, some doubt can remain as to whether he meant the climes of the world in a real or figurative sense. Still, in light of all the other evidence discussed so far, it seems likely that we can add this reference to a large accumulation of thirteenth-century assertions that a project of world conquest actually was being discussed by the supreme Mongol leadership.

⁵¹ *Göckenjan H.* Der Westfeldzug (1236–1242) aus mongolischer Sicht // Wahlstatt 1241. Beiträge zur Mongolenschlacht bei Liegnitz und zu ihren Nachwirkungen / Hrsg. U. Schmilewski. Würzburg, 1991. S. 38–39; *Zimonyi I.* The Mongol Campaigns against Eastern Europe // Zimonyi I. Medieval Nomads in Eastern Europe. Collected Studies. Bucharest, 2014. P. 32–332; *Mirgaleev I. M.* Kurultai of 1235: Question of expansion of the Ulus of Jochi // Golden Horde Review. 2014. No. 3 (5). P. 22–30.

⁵² The History of the World-Conqueror by Juvaini... P. 145.

As such, it is highly likely that the concept of world domination based on divine authority already had been formulated and authorised by the Mongol leadership before the events in 1235 and did not require any deliberate confirmation or formulation. The purpose of the Quriltai was to discuss the development of the immediate tactical goals of the Mongols' global empire, expansion to the West seeming to have top priority. Thus, the goals included subjugation of the Western Qipchaqs (also known as the Cumans or Polovtsy) and their allies, as well as communicating to all the rulers in the West — both Christian and Muslim — the demand to submit to the authority of the second Great Khan who ruled over the world in accordance with his predecessor's divine mandate and commanded an invincible military force.

Just like in 1221–1223, the new Western campaign was seen as an event of high imperial importance, its significance further stressed by the intention of Ögödei Qaghan to lead it personally. Both the first and the second Western campaigns were undertaken primarily in the interests of Jochi's dynasty headed by his second son Batu who had been recognized as the most senior of Genghis Khan's grandsons. The evidence of continuity between the Mongols' two Western campaigns is demonstrated by yet another fact: the overall military command of the Mongol armies was entrusted to Sübedei (Sübetei or Sübe'etei Ba'atur), the renowned veteran of the 1221–1223 campaign. According to Juwaynī, the participants of the Quriltai «decided to seize the lands of the Bulghar, the As and the Rus, which bordered on the camping grounds of Batu»; Ögödei «therefore deputed certain princes to aid and assist Batu, viz. Mengü Qa'an and his brother Böček; his own sons Güyük Khan and Qadaghan; of the other princes, Kölgen, Büri and Baidar; Batu's brothers, Hordu and Tangut; and several other princes as well as Sübetei Bahatur from amongst the chief commanders»⁵³.

The continuity of the Mongols' Western campaigns and the role of Sübedei is even more pronounced in the *Secret History of the Mongols*; the stories of both campaigns, separated by one and a half decades, are there tied within a single narrative: «Earlier on, Sübe'etei Ba'atur, campaigning against Meket (=Magas), Menkermen Keyibe (=Kiev) and other cities, had crossed the rivers Adil (=Volga) and Jayaq (=Ural) rich in water, and had reached as far as Qanglin (=Qangli), Kibča'ut (=Qipchaq), Bajigit (=Bashkirs), Orusut (=Rus'), Asut (=Alans), Sesüt (=Saqš'in of the lower Volga), Majar (=Magyars), Kešimir (=Kašmír (?)), Sergesüt (=Circassians), Buqar (=Volga Bulgars) and Kerel (=Hungarians) peoples. As Sübe'etei Ba'atur had been put in a difficult situation by these peoples, Ögödei Qa'an sent forth Batu, Büri, Güyük, Mōngge and several other princes in support of Sübe'etei. He ordered that Batu should be in command of all those princes who went on campaign...»⁵⁴.

The sources, therefore, show that the Great Western Campaign of the Mongols was aimed against several countries and peoples of Europe simultaneously, with the most significant among them being the Western Qipchaqs (*Cumans* or *Polovtsy*, as they were called in the West and in Rus', respectively), Volga Bulgars, Rus', Alans, and Hungarians. At the same time, the main goal of the conquests, like thirteen years prior, was still the Qipchaqs living west of the Volga. An analysis of evidence provided by the *Yuan Shi*, the official history of the

⁵³ Juwaynī. Ta'riḫ-i jahān-gushā... P. 224; The History of the World-Conqueror by Juvaini... P. 268–269.

⁵⁴ Козин С. А. Сокровенное сказание. С. 191–192, 312, 511; The secret history of the Mongols... P. 201, 989–991.

Yuan Dynasty, leads us to the same conclusion. According to Thomas T. Allsen, «The imperial decrees that initiated the campaign in the West, at least as they have come down to us in the Chinese sources, consistently name Qipchaq as the objective, except on occasions when all the territories granted to Jochi and his descendants are specified (i.e. Qipchaq, Rus', Alania, etc.). Moreover, in the *Yuan Shi* the biographies of military commanders who served in the West usually refer to the operations of 1236–1241 as the ‘Qipchaq Campaign’»⁵⁵.

The Qipchaqs in 1235 were the last among the numerous steppe peoples and tribes to hold out against the Mongols while maintaining their military and political organization — as well as a readiness for battle⁵⁶. Moreover, they instigated several anti-Mongol military coalitions, trying to get support, by various means and with success, from their neighbours — the Volga Bulgars, the Rus', and the Hungarians. From the point of view of Mongol strategists and military leaders, the coming war against the Volga Bulgars, Rus', and Hungary was necessary to achieve the main goal of the Western campaign — the lasting subjugation of the Qipchaqs. Achieving this goal required ensuring the safety of the rear and flanks of the Mongol armies continuing their conquests to the West, as well as depriving the Qipchaqs of support from their allies — both current and potential ones.

Southern Rus' and its capital Kiev had already become targets of the Mongol conquests at the planning stage of the 1221–1223 campaign. This can be explained by the close military, political, and dynastic ties of Southern Rus' princes with the Qipchaqs which became fully manifest at the Battle of the Kalka River⁵⁷. The Alans were military allies of the Qipchaqs and attacked the corps under Jebe and Sübedei when the Mongols first appeared in the North Caucasus (late 1221 and early 1222)⁵⁸. The Volga Bulgars, allied with other Volga peoples, attacked and inflicted a heavy defeat upon the departing Mongol army when it was retreating to the East at the end of 1223⁵⁹, and afterwards continued to offer stubborn resistance to the Mongols up to the beginning of the Great Western Campaign⁶⁰.

Among the goals of the Mongol conquests in the West, the primary sources cited above also mention the Hungarians using several historical terms to designate them — *Majar*, *Kerel* (from hung., *király* «king»), and also probably *Bajigit*⁶¹. *Kerel* was the Arabic-Persian name for the Hungarian and Polish kings in the Mongol period, and hence of their respective countries⁶². The use of several names for one ethnic group in pro-Mongol sources was evidently due

⁵⁵ Allsen T. T. Prelude to the Western Campaigns: Mongol military operations in the Volga-Ural region, 1217–1237 // Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi. 1983. Vol. 3. P. 22.

⁵⁶ See: Halperin Ch. J. The Kipchak Connection: The Ilkhans, the Mamluks and Ayn Jalut // Bulletin of the school of Oriental and African studies, University of London. 2000. Vol. 63. P. 229–245.

⁵⁷ See: Maiorov A. V. The first Mongol Invasion of Europe... P. 411–438.

⁵⁸ See: Allsen T. T. Mongols and North Caucasia... P. 11–17.

⁵⁹ See: Zimonyi I. The First Mongol Raids against the Volga-Bulgars // Altaistic Studies. Papers at the 25th meeting of the permanent international Altaistic conference at Uppsala, June 7–11, 1982 / Eds. G. Jarring and S. Rosén. Stockholm, 1985. P. 197–204.

⁶⁰ See: Zimonyi I. The Volga Bulgars between Wind and Water (1220–1236) // Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae. 1992/93. Vol. 46. P. 347–355.

⁶¹ See: Rashiduddin. Compendium of Chronicles... P. 21, N. 4; The Secret History of the Mongols. P. 959–960.

⁶² Pelliot P. Notes sur l'histoire de la Horde d'Or. Paris, 1949. P. 116 ff.; Ligeti L. A magyar nép mongol kori nevei (magyar, baskir, király) // Magyar Nyelv. 1964. T. 60. O. 384–404.

to the need to draw a distinction between eastern Hungarians, who lived in the Volga-Ural region⁶³, and the western Hungarians who had migrated to Pannonia and established the Kingdom of Hungary.

Keler (i. e. the Kingdom of Hungary) was a major target of the planned campaign. At the time when the Great Quriltai started in 1235, the Mongol strategists were already able to plan their military operations, not only against the eastern Hungarians, who were allies of the Volga Bulgars, but also against the Hungarian Kingdom in Central Europe. After their defeat in the Battle of the Kalka, some Cuman-Qipchaq chieftains started seeking assistance and an alliance with the Hungarian king. The essential preconditions for forming closer ties were conversion to Christianity and submission to royal power. Earlier, before the Battle at the Kalka, a Cuman prince named Basty accepted conversion to Christianity in Rus' to receive assistance against the Mongols⁶⁴. An active role in this conversion of the Cumans was played by the Hungarian royal heir, the future King Béla IV, Archbishop Robert of Esztergom, and the Hungarian Dominicans. In 1227, the Cuman prince Baibars (Barts / Bortz in the Hungarian sources) was the first to convert to Christianity and swear fealty to the Hungarian king⁶⁵. Soon a new Cuman Bishopric was established at the south-eastern borders of the Hungarian Kingdom (on the territory of Wallachia and Moldavia), with its centre in the Moldavian city of Milk (Malcom). All this played well into the eastward expansion plans of Hungarian kings who, starting from 1233, began to add *Rex Cumanorum* to their official title⁶⁶.

Other Cuman rulers followed the example of Baibars. The Hungarian Dominican, Friar Julian, who visited the Cuman land and Rus' in 1237 while gathering information about the military activity of the Mongols, reported that the Mongol ruler, certainly Ögödei Qaghan, had sent a large army, ultimately aimed in the direction of the Mediterranean Sea «against all the Cumans who had fled to the lands of Hungary»⁶⁷. As such, Julian speaks of this Cuman migration as a recent event. Earlier, during his first trip to the Volga region in 1234–1235, Julian had to spend six months in the land of the Alans (Northern Caucasus), being unable to continue his travel to the Volga owing to widespread fear of the Mongols who were somewhere

⁶³ *Vásáry I.* The Hungarians or Možars and the Meščers/Mišers of the Middle Volga Region // *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi*. 1975. Vol. 1. P. 237–275; *Хаутала P.* Сведения о заволжских мадьярах в латинских источниках XIII–XV веков // *История татар Западного Приуралья*, Т. 1: Кочевники Великой степи в Приуралье. Татарские средневековые государства. Казань, 2016. С. 156–177.

⁶⁴ ПСРЛ. Т. 2. Стб. 741; *The Galician-Volynian chronicle* / Transl. G. A. Perfecky. Munich, 1973. P. 28. — Since the Qipchaqs were typically terms Cumans in the West rather Qipchaqs, we use that term here to avoid confusion caused by the source material.

⁶⁵ See: *Хаутала P.* От «Давида, царя Индий» до «ненавистного плембса Сатаны»: Антология ранних латинских сведений о татаро-монголах. Казань, 2015. С. 279–355.

⁶⁶ See: *Berend N.* At the Gate of Christendom: Jews, Muslims and «Pagans» in Medieval Hungary, c. 1000 – c. 1300. Cambridge, 2001. P. 213–215; *Vásáry I.* Cumans and Tatars: Oriental Military in the Pre-Ottoman Balkans, 1185–1365. Cambridge, 2005. P. 137–138; *Kovács S.* Bortz, a Cuman Chief in the 13th century // *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungarica*. 2005. Vol. 58. P. 255–266; *Spinei V.* The Romanians and the Turkic Nomads North of the Danube delta from the tenth to the mid-thirteenth century. Leiden and Boston, 2009. P. 152–155; *Хаутала P.* Исторический контекст основания католической епархии Кумании 1227 года // *Золотоордынская цивилизация*. 2014. Вып. 7. С. 111–139.

⁶⁷ *Dörrie H.* Drei Texte... S. 175; *Mongolensturm...* S. 105, 118 n. 38.

in the vicinity⁶⁸. Attacks against the Cumans, which happened in the late 1220s and the early 1230s, were part of the new Mongol invasion of the Lower Volga and the Volga-Ural region being carried out by the Ulus of Jochi's forces⁶⁹.

The Mongol rulers evidently knew about the Cuman-Hungarian alliance and made diplomatic efforts to persuade the Hungarian king to submit voluntarily to the Qaghan's authority and abandon his support of the Cumans. This is evidenced by the ultimatum written in pagan letters in the Tatar language (*littere autem scripte sunt litteris paganis sed lingua tartarica*), translated and delivered by Friar Julian to King Béla IV at the end of 1237. This letter, allegedly on behalf of Ögödei, stated: «I wonder at you, king of Hungary, that although I have sent you messengers thirty times, you have sent me back none of them, nor did you send me messengers of your own or letters [...] Further, I have learned that you keep the Cumans, my slaves, under your protection. Whence I charge you that henceforward you do not keep them with you, and that you do not make me your enemy on their account»⁷⁰. The surviving translation of this message was carried out by an unnamed Cuman who was familiar enough with the Mongolian political culture and language that he was able to accurately convey the Mongols' official outlook on the wider world⁷¹.

Based on a cursory glance at the fuller history of the Mongol Empire's expansion, the Qaghan's demand that the Hungarians expel Cuman allies might simply be a case of divide-and-conquer or a mere pretext for war. Not only did King Béla ignore the ultimatum of the Mongols but he continued to strengthen relations with the Cumans. In 1239, the Hungarian king granted refuge on his land to a numerous group of them led by Kuthen who had formerly fought against the Mongols at the Battle of the Kalka River. As was standard, Kuthen and his people converted to Christianity and made an oath to defend the Hungarian Kingdom from common enemies⁷². One might conclude that after this action, a military confrontation between the Mongols and the Hungarians was inevitable — or one might imagine that it was just indeed a pretext to continue Mongol imperial expansion.

WESTERN CONTEMPORARIES ON THE GLOBAL CONQUEST PLANS OF THE MONGOLS AT THE TIME OF THE GREAT WESTERN CAMPAIGN AND IN ITS AFTERMATH

Despite their often sensationalistic and emotive tone, we argue that the earliest Western sources — particularly their statements regarding a Mongol plan of world conquest — fundamentally agree with the wider range of available materials and often originate from

⁶⁸ Dörrie H. Drei Texte... S. 154; Mongolensturm... S. 77.

⁶⁹ See: Korobeinikov D. A Brokien Mirror: The Kipchak World in the thirteenth century // The Other Europe in the Middle Ages: Avars, Bulgars, Khazars, and Cumans. Leiden and Boston, 2008. P. 389–390; Измайлов И. Походы в Восточную Европу 1223–1240 гг. // История татар с древнейших времен. Т. 3: Улус Джучи (Золотая орда). XIII – сер. XV вв. Казань, 2017. С. 145–149.

⁷⁰ Dörrie H. Drei Texte... S. 179, transl.: Sinor D. Diplomatic Practices in Medieval Inner Asia // The Islamic world from Classical to Modern times: Essays in Honor of Bernard Lewis. Bosworth et al. Princeton, 1989. P. 344.

⁷¹ Aigle D. De la 'non-négociation' à l'alliance inaboutie. Réflexions sur la diplomatie entre les Mongols et l'Occident latin // Oriente Moderno, Nuova serie. 2008. Vol. 88. P. 399.

⁷² Master Roger's Epistle to the sorrowful lament upon the destruction of the kingdom of Hungary by the Tatars / Transl. and com. M. Rady, J. M. Bak et al. Budapest, 2010. P. 136–141, 158–159.

reliable informants. As such, these details ought to be accepted as having a basis in reality. According to accounts, which first found their way to Europe in 1236 and 1237, Ögödei Qaghan's intentions were not limited to merely subjugating the Cumans and their closest allies; he also planned to advance his armies farther to Germany. Moreover, he aimed at conquering Rome and other even more distant Western targets. This information is reported only in Western sources. However, all these accounts in one way or another communicate information received from the Mongols, the actual participants and organizers of the Great Western Campaign.

The first person to report the plans of the Mongols (more often called the *Tatars* or *Tartars* in the Western writings) to attack German lands was the Dominican (or Cistercian) Friar Richardus⁷³, who was closely attached to the Roman Curia. He quoted the words of Friar Julian, who had returned from his first trip to the Volga toward the end of 1235 and announced that he had found Magna Hungaria, the original homeland of the Hungarians: «In this Hungarians land the said brother found the Tatars and the Tatar ruler's ambassador, who knew the Hungarian, Russian, Cuman, Teutonic, Saracen, and Tatar languages. He said that the Tatars' army, a five-day journey away, intended to go against Germany. Yet, the Mongols were waiting for another army which was to destroy the Persians»⁷⁴. This account of a planned attack on «Alemmania» (an unambiguous reference to German territory) apparently refers to the build-up of the Mongol troops under the command of Chormaqan Noyon to attack Greater Armenia⁷⁵. It might also reflect that they were still awaiting reinforcements in the Volga region from Mongol troops that had previously been campaigning in other regions. In any case, it certainly reflects the period shortly before the Mongols started their massive series of conquests which commenced in late 1236. The importance of this report can undoubtedly be seen in its inclusion in the *Book of Qualifications of the Roman Church*, the creation of which was initiated in 1228 at the behest of Pope Gregory IX; it was gradually supplemented until 1431⁷⁶. After returning from his second trip to the East at the end of 1237, Julian informed the Hungarian king about the plans of the Mongols to continue their conquests in the West up to Rome and even farther: «They intend to come and attack Rome and beyond Rome»⁷⁷.

Some recent researchers are sceptical about Richardus' and Julian's accounts. Sometimes we even encounter scholarly theories that Julian actually made only one trip to the East, and he never visited the Volga but rather encountered some Hungarians in the Northern Azov region. Magna Hungaria in the Volga-Ural region was, according to this view, just invented by Richardus⁷⁸.

⁷³ About Brother Richardus see: *Schiel J.* Mongolensturm und Fall Konstantinopels: Dominikanische Erzählungen im diachronen Vergleich. Berlin, 2011. S. 65–66, n. 109.

⁷⁴ *Dörrie H.* Drei Texte... S. 158; Mongolensturm... S. 79–80.

⁷⁵ See: *May T.* Chormaqan Noyan: The First Mongol military governor in the Middle East. Master's thesis. Indiana University, 1996. P. 49–50.

⁷⁶ See: *Dörrie H.* Drei Texte... S. 147–149.

⁷⁷ *Dörrie H.* Drei Texte... S. 178; Mongolensturm... S. 107.

⁷⁸ See : *Sinor D.* Le rapport du Dominicain Julien écrit en 1238 sur le péril mongol // *Comptes rendus des séances de l'Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres.* 2002. Vol. 146. P. 1161–1162; see also: *Gueret-Laferte M.* Sur les routes de l'Empire Mongol. *Ordre et rhétorique des relations de voyage aux XIIIe et XIVe siècle.* Paris: Champion, 1994. P. 37–38; *Berend N.* Przemysław Urbańczyk and Przemysław Wiszewski, *Central Europe in the High Middle Ages: Bohemia, Hungary and Poland, c. 900 – c. 1300.* Cambridge, 2013. P. 69–70.

In our opinion, there is not enough evidence to support such a far-reaching conclusion⁷⁹. Richardus may indeed have supplemented Julian's report of Magna Hungaria, resulting in certain inconsistencies in his account. However, Julian's stay on the Volga and the discovery of the Hungarian-speaking population there was confirmed by him personally during his visit to Rome in 1236. Even while he was staying in Rome, four other Dominican friars were sent to the Volga with accurate information about the location of Magna Hungaria and the route there which apparently could have only been provided by Julian who, indeed, later followed and joined his brothers from the Order⁸⁰. In addition, some details from Julian's Volga trip reported by Richardus that were previously considered unreliable have been confirmed as authentic — in particular, his account about the willingness of Grand Prince Yuri Vsevolodovich of Vladimir-Suzdal to convert to the Catholic faith⁸¹.

Some scholarly works express the opinion that Julian's assertion about Mongol plans to send their armies to Rome does not so much reflect the real intentions of the invaders but is rather connected with the speculative identification of the Mongols with the biblical Midianites (mentioned by Julian with reference to an unnamed Rus' cleric's opinion), who were predicted to conquer Rome shortly before the final era of history, according to the *Sermo* or *Revelations* by Pseudo-Methodius of Patara⁸².

We cannot readily agree with such viewpoints, though one certainly cannot deny the obvious fact that Friar Julian, like some other contemporary authors, interpreted the origin of the Mongols using a prophecy that was popular in Rus' and even further in the Christian West. One reason to trust the authenticity of the claim of Mongol military targets is that there is an interesting interplay in the timing of Ögödei's commission of the Great Western Campaign in 1235 and Julian's testimony. Friar Richardus' account of the meeting of Friar Julian with «the Tatar ruler's ambassador» happened in 1235 during the missionary's first journey when he stayed in the Volga region. Julian learned from this ambassador that the entire Tatar people «decided to leave their land in order to fight anyone who might choose to oppose them and to devastate all the kingdoms that they could subjugate», and that the Tatars in this way intended, as we have already mentioned above, to reach Germany⁸³.

Heinrich Dörrie was apparently the first scholar to notice that the words of the Mongol ruler's ambassador, heard by Julian and recorded by Richardus, were essentially a restatement of the decision on the Western Campaign made by the Genghisids during the Great Quriltai, and that the decision itself, just like the Quriltai, should be dated to the period preceding the departure of Julian from Magna Hungaria⁸⁴. Fortunately, we can identify the exact date of the latter event. From what Richardus says afterwards, it follows that Julian embarked on his

⁷⁹ See : *Richard J.* La Papauté et les missions d'Orient au Moyen Age (XIIIe–XVe siècles). Rome, 1977. P. 28–29; *Schiell J.* Mongolensturm und Fall Konstantinopels... S. 73, N. 133; *Хаутала P.* Ранние венгерские сведения о Западном походе монголов (1235–1242 гг.) // *Rossica Antiqua*. 2014. №. 2. С. 79–80.

⁸⁰ *Dörrie H.* Drei Texte... S. 180–181; *Mongolensturm...* S. 108–109.

⁸¹ See: *Maiorov A. V.* Church-union negotiations between Rome, Nicaea and Rus', 1231–1237 // *Orientalia Christiana Periodica*. 2018. Vol. 84. P. 392–398.

⁸² *Хаутала P.* От «Давида, царя Индий»... С. 395–396, примеч. 40.

⁸³ *Dörrie H.* Drei Texte... S. 159; *Mongolensturm...* S. 80.

⁸⁴ *Dörrie H.* Drei Texte... S. 159, N. 4:14; see also: *Хаутала P.* От «Давида, царя Индий»... С. 372, примеч. 32.

return journey on the date falling on «the feast of the Nativity of John the Baptist», that is, 21 June 1235⁸⁵.

It is more difficult to ascertain the dates when the Great Quriltai was held. The only available text we have for this is the account of Juwaynī whose narrative style did not strive for the accuracy of a formal, bureaucratic report. Rather, quite the opposite, it aimed at achieving a florid literary effect and is thus filled with poetic images and allegories. According to Juwaynī, the Quriltai was held «at the time when the world was a Garden of Iram, and the hands of the flowers from the bounty of the clouds were generous and munificent like the disposition of the King, and when the earth by the continuous favours of the heavens had donned many-coloured robes, and the trees and branches had drunk the sap of well-being and verdancy». The stream of innumerable gifts and the blessings that the Qaghan poured out upon his subjects during the Quriltai, «were like the spring rain»⁸⁶. The large number of spring metaphors and images in this poetic description suggest that the event in question must have happened in the spring of 1235.

In any case, there is an intriguing chronological proximity between the decision-making event in Mongolia and Friar Julian hearing something similar from the «Tartar envoy.» This might explain the appearance of the envoy from the Tatars' leader (most probably Batu) on the Volga already in June 1235. The envoy hastened to inform the rulers of Volga Bulgaria and Magna Hungaria about the Qaghan's plans to attack them. Apparently, the envoy carried with him a written ultimatum, which in its form and content was similar to the ultimatums soon to be delivered to the Hungarian King, the German Emperor, and the Saljūq Sultan of Rūm⁸⁷. Yet, it could rather be the case that the envoy merely expressed the mandate of world conquest to Julian because it already existed long before the Quriltai of 1235 and was the standard formula of Mongol ambassadors in any region including the Volga — even before the arrival of the main princely armies from Mongolia.

After his talk with the Mongols' ambassador, Friar Julian was left with no doubt that not only the residents of the Volga region, but the whole West would face extreme danger in the immediate future. Since we know that the Mongol Empire's ambassador spoke several languages including Hungarian (probably Julian's native language), he was able to clearly convey to Julian the immensity of Mongol military strength and the scale of the upcoming conquests which were to begin in the Volga region and continue to Germany. Julian's actions certainly suggest he believed Christendom itself was in real danger; he immediately ceased the missionary work that he had just started in the Volga region, and without losing more time, hastened to return to the West to warn his fellow Dominicans and the Roman Curia. What he heard about Mongol intentions forced Julian not only to cancel his missionary work - the main objective of the entire expedition - but also to start his return trip at a time unfavourable for travel; Dörrie comments that Julian had to travel back to the West during the autumn without successfully completing his missionary work — all suggesting a sense of panicked urgency⁸⁸.

⁸⁵ Dörrie H. *Drei Texte...* S. 160, 162; *Mongolensturm...* S. 80–81.

⁸⁶ Juwaynī. *Ta'rikh-i jahān-gushā...* P. 154–155; *The History of the World-Conqueror by Juvaini...* P. 196–197.

⁸⁷ Хаутала P. *Ранние венгерские сведения...* С. 87.

⁸⁸ Dörrie H. *Drei Texte...* S. 159, N. 5:1; see also: Хаутала P. *От «Давида, царя Индий»...* С. 372, примеч. 33.

Another reason not to doubt Friar Julian's early warnings about the Mongols planning to conquer Europe is that such information about the far-reaching conquest plans of the Mongols against Germany and the entire Christian West is supported by numerous confirmations in other sources which are not related to the Hungarian Dominicans but provide information received from the Mongols themselves. Some of these accounts came from the Hungarian Kingdom's secular and ecclesiastical authorities who sought to warn others in the West of the imminent danger.

In his mid-thirteenth-century *Chronica majora*, Matthew Paris cites a letter from a certain Hungarian bishop to an unnamed bishop of Paris (possibly Guillaume III d'Auvergne). In this letter, the likewise unnamed Hungarian prelate wrote about his interrogation of two Tatar scouts captured somewhere in Rus'. He provided new information concerning the origins and aggressive ambitions of the Tatars obtained from this interrogation⁸⁹. A fuller version of this letter can be found in the Annals of Waverley (a monastery near Farnham, Surrey), completed in the late thirteenth century. In the latter record, some important and useful additional information is given: the Hungarian bishop learned from his captives that the Tatars came out of their land «in order to conquer the world» because «they believe that they will conquer the whole world»⁹⁰. The cited document can be dated to the end of 1239 or beginning of 1240 when the Mongols were preparing for their invasion of Kiev and Southern Rus', and its author was most probably Bishop Stephen of Vác (István Bancsa, d. 1270)⁹¹. The importance of this account is further enhanced by the fact that its author, warning about the danger that was common to the whole West, did not, as far as we can judge, try to obtain any personal benefits or aid for Hungary; he was ostensibly guided only by a sense of duty to warn his fellow Christians of the coming disaster which would indeed materialize deep in continental Europe starting in early 1241.

In July 1241, when the Hungarian territories to the north and east of the Danube were already in the Mongols' hands, the Hungarian king, Béla IV, informed the German king, Conrad IV, about the invaders' future plans: «...we know for certain that they plan to seize Germany unawares with the arrival of winter, and as soon as any resistance there is suppressed, to conquer all other kingdoms and provinces»⁹². One might suspect that the Hungarian king, who was desperately seeking military help from Western Europe, unlike the author of the previous account, deliberately exaggerated the danger by reinforcing old rumours about the aggressive intentions of the Mongols. Yet, it seems more plausible that King Béla would have based his conclusions not only on the information long known in the West from the reports provided by Friar Julian but also on some new information received, as it were, straight out of the horse's mouth — namely, from the envoys of the Mongol Qaghan who arrived at the Hungarian court shortly before the invasion of Batu's armies.

⁸⁹ Matthaei Parisiensis Chronica Majora / Ed. H. R. Luard. London, 1882. Vol. 6. (Rerum Britannicarum medii aevi scriptores. T. 57/6). P. 75.

⁹⁰ Annales monasterii de Waverleia // Annales monastici / Ed. H. R. Luard. London, 1865. Vol. 2. (Rerum Britannicarum medii aevi scriptores. T. 36/2). P. 324–325.

⁹¹ See: Maiorov A. V. The Mongolian Capture of Kiev: The Two Dates // Slavonic and East European Review. 2016. Vol. 94. P. 707–712.

⁹² Das Baumgartenberger Formelbuch: Eine Quelle zur Geschichte des XIII. Jahrhunderts, vornehmlich der Zeiten Rudolfs von Habsburg / Hrsj. H. Baerwald. Vein, 1866. (Fontes rerum Austriacarum. T. II/25). S. 348.

One such envoy is mentioned by an exiled French cleric, Ivo of Narbonne, in his letter to Archbishop Gerald of Bordeaux, recorded in the *Chronica majora* by Matthew Paris. In 1241, he reported, an Englishman was captured on the Austrian-Hungarian border together with a group of Mongols. That Englishmen had once been exiled from his homeland, had wandered for a while in the East, and then entered the service of the Mongols. After he was taken prisoner, the Duke of Austria recognized him as the envoy of the Mongol Qaghan: «Under the authority of the despicable king of the Tatars, he twice came to the king of Hungary [as] an ambassador and interpreter and threatened the king, after citing numerous examples, with the atrocities that they would commit if he did not surrender himself and his kingdom to be slaves of the Tartars»⁹³. Most probably that was the same polyglot emissary who had met Friar Julian in 1235 in the Volga region⁹⁴. Unless we attribute these remarkable predictions of so many various authors to mere clairvoyance, then we must accept that the information they were reporting *before* the invasion of Hungary reflected information that originated, ultimately, from the Mongols themselves. Thus, the attack on Europe was a campaign that was planned and carried out within a planned project of world conquest.

Certainly, Pope Gregory IX and Emperor Frederick II were convinced that Mongol expansion in the West would not be limited just to the Hungarian kingdom. In a letter to the abbot of Heiligenkreuz Abbey dated to 19 June 1241, the Pope wrote: «We learn from the letters of the noble men, dukes [...] of Austria and [...] of Carinthia that after the Tatars have invaded and to a great extent conquered the Hungarian kingdom, they, indiscriminately of gender and age, making their swords drunk with the blood of all whom they can seize, desire to invade the Czech and the German kingdoms and to turn the entire Christian land into desert and to ruin our faith»⁹⁵. As we can see, the Pope did not use the much earlier reports of Richardus or Julian, but rather information recently obtained in 1241 from sources that included the Duke of Austria who had personally spoken with the ambassador of the Mongol Qaghan.

Emperor Frederick II confirmed the specific intentions of the conquerors in his encyclical against the Tatars dated 20 June 1241: «We are firmly convinced that the Tatars' desire is to desecrate the mother of our religion and faith, the Holy Roman Church, and to seize the capital and the main city of our Empire by right of dominance or better [to say] — by violence»⁹⁶.

Frederick II obviously knew about the aggressive plans of the Mongols in advance and received his information from what could be called its original source. Around the same time

⁹³ Matthaei Parisiensis Chronica Majora / Ed. H. R. Luard. London, 1877. Vol. 4. (Rerum Britannicarum medii aevi scriptores. T. 57/4). P. 274 — For Ivo of Narbonne, see: *Bezzola G. A.* Die Mongolen in abendländischer Sicht (1220–1270): Ein Beitrag zur Frage der Völkerbegegnungen. Bern and Munich, 1974. S. 82–86; *Segl P.* Ketzer in Österreich: Untersuchungen über Häresie und Inquisition im Herzogtum Österreich im 13. und beginnenden 14. Jahrhundert. Paderborn, 1984. S. 76–111.

⁹⁴ *Ronay G.* The Tartar Khan's Englishman. London, 1978; see the comments: *Morgan D. O.* The Mongol empire: a review article // Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies. 1981. Vol. 44. P. 121–122.

⁹⁵ *Epistolae saeculi XIII e regestis Pontificum Romanorum selectae per G. H. Pertz / Ed. K. Rodenberg.* Berlin, 1883 (Monumenta Germaniae Historica. Epistolae saeculi XIII, 1). P. 722–723.

⁹⁶ *Constitutiones et Acta publica Imperatorum et Regum / Ed. L. Weiland.* Hanover, 1896. Vol. 2. (Monumenta Germaniae Historica. Legum. T. IV/2). P. 322–325.

that the Hungarian king started to receive ultimatums, the Holy Roman Emperor likewise received a message from the Mongol Qaghan. The document of the text has not survived. The only evidence of it is a report in the mid-thirteenth-century *Chronicle* of the Cistercian monk, Alberic de Trois-Fontaines, who resided at Trois-Fontaines Abbey in Champagne. The chronicle reads under the year 1238: «The Tatar king wrote to Emperor Frederick and commanded that if he yielded to the Tatar king, he would be able to choose any occupation at his court and to retain his land. The Emperor replied that he had a good understanding of birds and could become a good falconer to him [the khan]»⁹⁷. The trustworthiness of this report is sometimes doubted by scholars⁹⁸. Such doubts, however, are not concerned with the khan's ultimatum or its content, but rather the whimsical answer of the emperor by which he expressed his readiness to recognize the supreme power of the Mongol khan. Yet, he could have simply been making a mocking joke which in retrospect seems inappropriate given how destructive the 1241–1242 invasion of Batu subsequently proved to be in parts of Europe.

The news about the imminent Mongol conquest looming over the whole world also reached as far as France and England. Under the year 1238, Matthew Paris noted the arrival of Saracen envoys to the French king and then the English king, telling them how «some monstrous and wild tribe has overcome the northern mountains and conquered the vast and rich lands of the East, devastated Magna Hungaria, at the same time sending threatening letters with terrifying messengers everywhere. Their leader claims that he was sent by the Almighty God to subjugate the peoples disobedient to God»⁹⁹. These envoys, most likely the Ismailis of Syria, were sent to the West in the hopes of forming a Christian-Muslim alliance against the Mongols to stop their global expansion by combining forces¹⁰⁰. William of Nangis and other French chroniclers recorded that in 1237, two Ismaili *fidā'īs* were sent to France to assassinate King Louis IX. Their leader, however, soon changed his mind and sent two new envoys, this time with a peaceful mission¹⁰¹. Possibly, the sudden change in Ismaili policy was due to Alamut's decision to seek help from the West against the Mongols¹⁰². If so, their recapitulation of the worldwide scope of the Mongol plans is yet another valid corroboration — this time originating indirectly from non-European informants.

Though it might seem implausible that Ismailis would look to their long-time foes in the Levant for assistance from the Mongols, it cannot be readily dismissed. The Qipchaqs sought help from the Rus' in 1223 despite the fact that warfare was a mainstay of Rus'-Qipchaq relations for over a century. Moreover, one cannot dismiss Matthew Paris's description of this episode wholesale without explaining why the Middle Eastern envoys cited statements emerging from the Mongols that so closely resemble statements likewise attributed to them

⁹⁷ *Albrici monachi Trium Fontium Chronica* / Ed. P. Scheffer-Boichorst // *Monumenta Germaniae Historica. Scriptorum*. Hanover, 1874. Vol. 23. P. 943.

⁹⁸ *Jackson P.* *Mongols and the West...* P. 61.

⁹⁹ *Matthaei Parisiensis Chronica Majora* / Ed. H. R. Luard. London, 1876. Vol. 3. (*Rerum Britannicarum medii aevi scriptores*. T. 57/3). P. 488–489.

¹⁰⁰ *May T.* *A Mongol-Isma'ili Alliance? Thoughts on the Mongols and Assassins* // *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Third Series*. 2004. Vol. 14. P. 235.

¹⁰¹ *Chronique latine de Guillaume de Nangis de 1113 à 1300* / Ed. H. Giraud. Paris, 1843. Vol. 1. P. 188.

¹⁰² *Saunders J. J.* *Matthew Paris and the Mongols* // *Essays in Medieval History Presented to Bertie Wilkinson*. Toronto, 1969. P. 122, n. 11.

and recorded in medieval sources from several regions that were distant in geographical, linguistic, and cultural senses. For instance, Genghis Khan was reported by the pro-Mongol historian, Juwaynī, to have told the grandees of the city of Bukhara that he was a punishment from God¹⁰³. The language of «disobedience» to a divine command also shows up in the translated edict of Güyük Khan and a separate letter of Baiju Noyan, Mongol high commander in the Middle East, which were taken back to the papal curia and recorded in Latin translation by Simon of Saint-Quentin in 1247¹⁰⁴.

It is thus clear that information about Mongol plans for global conquest came to the West in various ways and through different channels as early as the second half of the 1230s. This information continued to pour in directly from Mongol authorities even after the end of the Great Western Campaign, thereby demonstrating that its planners' goals had not yet been fully achieved. Despite Mongol troops evacuating the Hungarian Kingdom in 1242, anxious foreboding concerning a possible subsequent invasion remained. This was soon to be confirmed by a somewhat mysterious Rus' archbishop named Peter. Having arrived at the papal court in the autumn of 1244, Peter claimed that the Mongols still «intended to subjugate the whole world, and that they had received a divine revelation that they would devastate the whole world within thirty-nine years»¹⁰⁵.

The information provided by Peter was undoubtedly based on the interpretation of the *Revelations of Pseudo-Methodius*, known in Rus' from the early twelfth century¹⁰⁶. This circumstance guaranteed, as it were, the reliability of the information about the Tatars, both in the eyes of Peter and his listeners in the West. The report concerning the claims of the Mongols to hold power over the whole world, confirmed by the evidence from other sources, was not in doubt — nor was the overwhelming strength of the Mongol armies. For this reason, it was not difficult for the Rus' archbishop to achieve the main goal of his visit to the West which was to convince the Pope to send ambassadors to the Mongol rulers who would inevitably perceive such a gesture as an expression of readiness to recognize their supreme power¹⁰⁷.

Just like Friar Julian before him, Archbishop Peter supported his claims concerning the Mongols and their future plans by referring to a reliable Mongol source — a certain Tatar grandee named Chalaladan who was married to Chirkan's (*viz.* «Chinggis Khan» in Turkic) daughter¹⁰⁸. At the same time, a reference to the popular prophecy of Pseudo-Methodius shows that it was being employed to help in conceptualizing the existing information about the poorly understood invaders from an eschatological perspective existing in Christian societies. Emphasizing the immensity of the looming threat, both Friar Julian and Archbishop Peter by no means exaggerated the real danger that the Mongols could have posed to the West.

¹⁰³ The History of the World-Conqueror by Juvaini... P. 105.

¹⁰⁴ Simon of Saint-Quentin. History of the Tartars... XXXII:51, 52.

¹⁰⁵ Dörrie H. Drei Texte... S. 192-193.

¹⁰⁶ Klopprogge A. Ursprung und Ausprägung des abendländischen Mongolenbildes im 13. Jahrhundert: ein Versuch zur Ideengeschichte des Mittelalters. Wiesbaden, 1993. S. 174–176.

¹⁰⁷ See: Maiorov A. V. The Rus Archbishop Peter at the First Council of Lyon // Journal of Ecclesiastical History. 2020. Vol. 71. P. 20–39.

¹⁰⁸ For more, see: Jackson P. The Testimony of the Russian «Archbishop» Peter Concerning the Mongols (1244/5): Precious Intelligence or Timely Disinformation? // Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Third Series. 2016. Vol. 26. P. 71, ff.

After the highly destructive invasions of Rus' and the Latin West (1237–1242), the Mongol message, now directly from their mouths and imperial decrees, stayed consistent with the pre-invasion warnings that exist in the sources. The ambassadors officially sent by Pope Innocent IV to the Mongols in the spring of 1245, led by John of Plano Carpini, brought back an ultimatum in 1247 from the recently enthroned Güyük Qaghan which confirmed something already obvious to the West — the Mongols were genuinely striving to establish dominance over the whole world, and their Qaghan demanded submission from the Pope in the same way that they had demanded it from other rulers: «By the power of God [from] the going up of the sun to [his] going down [He] has delivered all the lands to Us; We hold them. Except by the command of God, how can anyone do [anything]? Now you must say with a sincere heart: “We shall become [your] subjects; we shall give [our] strength”. Thou in person at the head of the kings, you must all together at once come to do homage to Us. We shall then recognize your submission. And if you do not accept God’s command and act contrary to Our command, We shall regard you as enemies»¹⁰⁹.

Carpini also claimed that the newly elected supreme ruler of the Mongols, Güyük Qaghan, would definitely start a new large-scale war if all the peoples and rulers of the West, beginning with the Pope, did not submit to him: «The aforesaid Cuyuc Khan raised his standard, along with those of all his princes, against the Church of God and the Roman Empire, and against all the states of Christendom and the people of the west, unless they do what he has ordered of the Lord Pope, and the great men, and the whole population of the western Christians». Carpini even had some information about the planned entry routes for the Mongol attacks and the estimated length of the campaign: «We were told that one army is to enter through Hungary, and the second through Poland. What is more, they come to fight constantly for eighteen years. That is the time allotted to the campaign». The credibility of such information was not in doubt since some of it came from Güyük Qaghan himself: «The emperor said with his own mouth that he wished to send an army into Livonia and Prussia»¹¹⁰. Carpini subsequently told the Franciscan Salimbene de Adam that the Mongols planned to conquer Italy¹¹¹.

Carpini’s mission provided evidence confirming another detail of importance to us; the decision to undertake a military campaign against all Western countries had been made long before Güyük Qaghan’s ultimatum which was essentially a mere reaffirmation of the military project of his predecessor, Ögödei Qaghan, before the start of the Great Western Campaign. A Franciscan friar calling himself «C. de Bridia», who was possibly detained by Batu and had to spend about a year in his land (1246–1247), wrote that Ögödei «placed his brother’s son Batu in command of the first [army] and sent him to the West against God’s Church and all the provinces of the West»¹¹².

Based on the above accounts, it follows that Batu received the order to conquer the whole West when he was appointed the supreme commander of the Great Western Campaign,

¹⁰⁹ *Pelliot P. Les Mongols et la papauté [part 1] // Revue de l’Orient Chretien. 1922–1923. T. 23. P. 17 (transcription). P. 18 (French transl.) and n. 3; English transl. (by J. A. Boyle) in: Rachewiltz I. de. Papal Envoys to the Great Khans. Stanford, 1971. Appendix. P. 214.*

¹¹⁰ *Giovanni di Plan di Carpini. Storia dei Mongoli... P. 294–295; The Story of the Mongols whom we call the Tartars... P. 86–87.*

¹¹¹ *Salimbene de Adam. Cronica / Ed. G. Scalia. Turnhout, 1998. T. 1. P. 317.*

¹¹² *Hystoria Tartarorum C. de Bridia monachi / Ed. A. Önnersfors. Berlin, 1967. P. 18; The Vinland Map and the Tartar Relation. New Haven; London, 1965. P. 78.*

that is, already during the Great Quriltai of 1235. The ultimatums that were received by the Hungarian King and the German Emperor soon afterwards confirm that the overall goal of the Mongols to invade not only the Hungarian kingdom, but also all other Western countries, both Christian and Muslim. This plan must have already been in existence when preparations for the Great Western Campaign began. Indeed, evidence that the Islamic West was also targeted at the great Quriltai, immediately afterwards receiving the Qaghan's envoys with submission demands, is made clear in the account of a historian of the Saljūq Sultanate of Rūm, Ibn Bībī (d. ca. 1280). He recorded that in 633 AH (1236), the amīr, Shams al-Dīn Umar Qazwīnī, was trading in Turkestan. There, he was asked by a Mongol noble about his standing in the Saljūq Sultanate and, having responded about his close connections with its ruling elites, he was sent back to Anatolia with an edict written in the name of Ögödei Qaghan. The edict stated that God had given the Mongols domination over the whole of the earth's surface and invited the Saljūqs' submission, threatening an invasion with mass slaughter and enslavement if they refused to submit¹¹³. Ögödei's recorded language was much like his son's — and more importantly to the main argument of this paper, it was similar to the language of his father, Genghis Khan. It reflected a multi-generational project that had stayed rather consistent in its aims and its expressed formulae. In the third generation of great Mongol khans, Güyük Qaghan's cousin, Qubilai, echoed the age-old message — like it was something as unchanging as Eternal Heaven. In 1268, while remonstrating with his Korean subjects, on the other side of the Eurasian continent from Rome and the Latin West, he reminded them of their obligations to show submission to the Mongol Empire. They were to send hostages, support the army with troops, supply food, establish postal *yam* stations, register their populace to a census, and receive Mongol *darugachi* overseers. He noted that this was the very legal system established by his great ancestor, Genghis Khan, the dynasty's founder, and that it had continued uninterrupted to the present («太祖法制，凡內屬之國，納質、助軍、輸糧、設驛、編戶籍、置長官，已嘗明諭之，而稽延至今»)¹¹⁴. Such a list of obligations for the Mongols' subjects, so clearly and plainly stated, is not mere speculation on the part of later scholars. We have it from the mouths of khans — and we should accept their word as well about who it was that first decreed and established the ideology that underpinned conquest in practical terms.

CONCLUSIONS

Sensationalistic news regarding the intention of the Mongols to conquer and subjugate the whole world, which sent shockwaves across Europe in the late 1230s and provoked the emergence of strong apocalyptic sentiments, was not something that would be news at all for the invaders themselves or for those countries and peoples who had already found themselves in the way of the Mongol westward advance during the previous decades — for instance the Orthodox Rus' and the Muslims of the Middle East. After a major invasion of Europe in the 1240s, Carpini's mission to Mongolia only confirmed that world conquest was still on the table and Europe was still seen as a rebellious enemy.

In the view of Mongol strategists, the devastating military invasion of the West, if not comprehensive, could always be followed by peace negotiations on terms dictated by the

¹¹³ Histoire des Seldjoucides d'Asie Mineure d'après Ibn Bibi / Ed. M. Th. Houtsma. Leiden, 1902. P. 203; Die Seltschukengeschichte des Ibn Bibi. Copenhagen, 1959. P. 194–195.

¹¹⁴ Yuan Shi... P. 4614.

invaders. Participants in such negotiations were not perceived by the Mongols as their equals. Peace made with any external actor was perceived by the Mongols as the acceptance of political dependence on their world empire. Thus, the imperial system that the Mongols were striving to create could have only been controlled through military force and the constant threat of its use.

We have argued here that there is much evidence that the world conquest ideology was fully formed, voiced, and being carried out across Eurasia by the start of the 1220s. We favour the oft-overlooked information that Friar Julian heard from the Mongols' adversaries that it was Genghis Khan's success in Transoxiana which lent it its strongest impulse. The sacred space encompassed in the Mongol conquests would have included even all the prominent countries of the West whose rulers were trying to avoid any direct and unconditional recognition of the paramount sovereignty of the Great Khan. The religious ideal of a global empire, conceived already by Genghis Khan and embraced by his descendants, was implacable — the *raison d'être* of the *yeke mongqol ulus*. Thus, the conquest of North-Eastern Rus', located outside the main line of the Mongol invasion of the West, and the conquest of Danubian Bulgaria after Batu's withdrawal from Central Europe, were probably not carried out on mere whims. Each Mongol campaign was larger than itself, since it carried the potential for further conquests aimed at reaching the limits of the seven climes. The divine mandate of the Great Khan held real power like the Mongol armies themselves. It undoubtedly wielded an effect not only on the Mongols, but also their opponents — as a mobilizing or demoralizing force.

It was typical for medieval Western observers to project old, familiar ideas upon new situations that they had to face in a Eurasia that was rapidly expanding in their view; hence their habit of using archaic ethnonyms that reflected their desire to ascribe their own preconceptions and stereotypes onto unfamiliar peoples. This trend in thirteenth-century authors has aroused justified scepticism in modern historians, but we have argued that legitimate information should not be tossed aside like the proverbial baby going out with the bathwater. Obviously, the oecumene envisaged by the Christian authors was not the same as the oecumene conceived in the conquest plans of the Mongols. It should be noted that for the Mongol strategists, the Latin West, while consisting of numerous kingdoms inhabited by various hostile peoples, was represented by two supreme rulers — the German Emperor and the Pope. If informants from the Islamic world made this known to them, it explains why Germany and Rome were the main objectives of the Mongol conquests in the West, announced even before the Great Western Campaign. They remained so until Batu terminated the campaign in 1242–1243. Rogerius of Varad, who lived through the Mongol occupation of Hungary, wrote that the Mongols abandoned their plans to attack Germany only in the spring of 1242 when they abruptly began to withdraw from Hungary¹¹⁵.

The Mongols were unable to resume implementing their sacred plan in the West for various reasons, including political disruption resulting from the death of Ögödei Qaghan, heavy losses of Mongol troops, technological issues (navies, fortifications, etc.), and possibly severe weather or climatic conditions¹¹⁶. Despite overwhelming military strength, and some logistical

¹¹⁵ Master Roger's Epistle... P. 218–219.

¹¹⁶ For more, see: *Laszlovszky J. et al.* Contextualizing the Mongol Invasion of Hungary in 1241–42: Short- and Long-Term Perspectives // *Hungarian Historical Review*. 2018. P. 419–450, here: P. 436–438; see also: *Pow S.* Climatic and Environmental Limiting Factors in the Mongol Empire's Westward Expansion: Exploring Causes for the Mongol Withdrawal from Hungary in

and technological advantages, the Mongols' methods of warfare and control were limited by the capacities of a steppe-based empire, alongside the material and human resources available to the Mongol rulers. All the same, contemporaries had little doubt about their worldwide goals and plans for a prolonged stay in the West. Carpini claimed that when the invaders had come to Hungary and Poland, «they had meant to fight thirty years» as they intended to «overthrow the whole world or reduce it to servitude»¹¹⁷. The long-term plans of the Mongols with respect to the subjugation of the West seem to be confirmed by another observer. An envoy from Song China who visited Ögödei Qaghan's court in 1237 saw the Mongol army marching across the steppe «all day long without breaks», with «many thirteen- and fourteen-year-olds» in the ranks. These Mongol teenagers had been mobilized for the war against the Qipchaqs as part of the Great Western Campaign and were supposed to go into battle only three years later¹¹⁸. Thus, the war against the West was planned for many years to come and was to involve several generations of Mongol combatants. The Song envoy was seeing the preparations for what Carpini later warned was intended to be a long war.

In short, the conquest efforts in the West were not a minor sideshow for the Mongols. According to various sources, the Great Western Campaign involved at least nine senior princes from the four branches of the ruling dynasty. Genghis Khan's grandchildren and great-grandchildren, including two sons of the ruler, Ögödei Qaghan, took part. One of them, Güyük, soon became the next Qaghan. Friar C. de Bridia stated that Güyük, following the policy of his father, «allocated a third of all his force» to a new war against the West¹¹⁹. The simultaneous struggle with Song China, however, saw the Qaghan direct the larger forces of the Mongol Empire there. The West remained a primary direction for expansion, but smaller forces were deployed for this purpose — two men in every ten¹²⁰. This was possibly not by choice but rather by necessity. More troops taken from the local population could serve in the East but only the Mongol and Turkic nomadic cavalry was believed to be capable of surviving the journey to the West as Yelü Chucai pointed out during strategic councils on the matter around 1235¹²¹.

Alongside the subjugation of China, the conquest of the West was one of the most ambitious goals to ever emerge in Mongol imperial history. It required consolidation of resources and concentration of efforts across the entire empire and, therefore, directly depended on the stability of the supreme authority. The death of Ögödei allowed divisions among the Mongol elite to fester, something that ultimately led to the collapse of the empire. Internecine struggles gradually pushed the conquest of the West further into the background in favour of more pressing plans in China and the Middle East. Nevertheless, the religious ideal of a global empire remained relevant even after the collapse of Genghis Khan's unified state. The Mongols' imperial ambitions toward the West were not confined

1242 // Socio-Environmental Dynamics along the Historical Silk Road / Eds. Liang Emlyn Yang et al. Cham, 2019. P. 301–321.

¹¹⁷ *Giovanni di Plan di Carpine*. Storia dei Mongoli... P. 295; The Story of the Mongols whom we call the Tartars... P. 87.

¹¹⁸ Meng-Ta pei-lu und Hei-Ta shih-lüeh... S. 207.

¹¹⁹ *Hystoria Tartarorum*... P. 22; The Vinland Map and the Tartar Relation... P. 84.

¹²⁰ *Juwaynī*. Ta' rīkh-i jahān-gushā. P. 211–212; The History of the World-Conqueror by Juvaini... P. 256.

¹²¹ Yuan Shi... P. 3460.

to threats and ultimatums. These ambitions were actualized in new military campaigns against Hungary and Poland in the second half of the thirteenth century. Moreover, this persistent imperialistic drive saw many polities in south-eastern Europe periodically submitting to the Mongols in the same period¹²².

Информация о статье

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Заголовок: To «Conquer Rome and beyond Rome»: The Mongol ideology of world domination in Medieval reality and imagination [«Напасть на Рим и за пределами Рима»: Идеология мирового господства монголов в средневековой реальности и воображении]

Резюме: Главное положение, выдвигаемое в данной статье, заключается в том, что глобальная стратегия завоеваний монголов сформировалась еще до планирования Великого Западного похода на курултае 1235 г. Свидетельства в источниках, созданных в разных регионах, на разных языках и в разное время сходятся в том, что глобальные военные цели монголов были сформулированы, выражены и, — что самое важное — начали реализовываться на практике уже в период правления Чингисхана (1206–1227). Претензии монголов на мировое господство имели прочную основу в религиозном мировоззрении монгольской элиты и подкреплялись их верой в божественную избранность своего верховного вождя и его законных преемников, получивших Мандат Великого Неба на то, чтобы править всем миром. Целый ряд фактов указывает, что религиозный идеал глобальной империи был задуман и реализован Чингисханом еще во время победоносного похода на запад в 1219–1221 гг., итогом которого стало подчинение Хорезмийской империи. Иначе невозможно объяснить, каким образом, никак не связанные между собой источники и на востоке, и на западе Евразии, включая дипломатические документы, совпадают в понимании той идеологии, которая двигала монгольскими армиями. При этом ультиматумы, в которых содержатся обоснования монгольского мирового господства, исходили, если не напрямую от Чингисхана и его приемников, то от их военных и дипломатических представителей. Это позволяет думать, что цель завоевания мира была санкционирована на самых высоких уровнях принятия решений Монгольской империей.

Ключевые слова: Монгольская империя, Чингисхан, Угедей, Монгольско-европейские отношения, Хорезмийская империя, средневековая дипломатия

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¹²² For more, see: *Jackson P.* Mongols and the West... P. 201–206; *Vásáry I.* Cumans and Tatars... P. 69–94; *Uzelac A.* A century of the Tatars' «hegemony»: the Golden Horde and Bulgarian lands (1241–1341) // *The Routledge Handbook of the Mongols and Central-Eastern Europe*. London; New-York, 2021. P. 212–232.

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Information about the article

The study is supported by the Russian Scientific foundation grant No 24-18-00407 «The world's conquest and the collapse of the global empire: the Mongol invasion in the fate of the Russian lands of the 13th century»

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Title: To «Conquer Rome and beyond Rome»: The Mongol ideology of world domination in Medieval reality and imagination

Summary: The argument advanced here is that the global conquest strategy of the Mongols had taken shape already before the planning of the Great Western Campaign in 1235. Evidence from geographically, linguistically, and chronologically diverging sources all re-echo the claim that a goal of world conquest had been formulated, expressed, and – most importantly — pursued in practical terms already during the reign of Genghis Khan (r. 1206–1227). The Mongols' claims to world domination had a solid basis in the religious worldview of the Mongol elite and were supported by their faith in the divine chosen-ness of their supreme leader, and his legitimate successors, who had been granted the Mandate of Heaven to rule the world. We suggest that a range of evidence points to the religious ideal of a universal empire being conceived in its full sense and put into practice by Genghis Khan during the brilliant First Western Campaign of 1219–1221 which resulted in the subjugation of the Khwārazmian Empire. Since, we find evidence of this from matching descriptions and implications laid out in Eastern and Western Eurasian sources (including contemporary diplomatic reports) that likely could have not mutually informed each other, it is difficult to explain it away as something based on a widespread, identical misunderstanding among the Mongols' adversary states and peoples. Moreover, the claims often can be traced to Genghis Khan, his successors, and military and diplomatic representatives, implying that the goal of world conquest was one sanctioned at the highest decision-making levels of the Mongol imperial court.

Keywords: Mongol Empire, Genghis Khan, Ögödei Khan, Mongol-European relations, Khwārazmian Empire, world conquest, medieval diplomacy, historiography, sources studies

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